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ABSTRACT
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are
the primary technology used to automate our critical infrastructure
and major industries in order to improve their efficiency. Their
dependability is challenged by probable vulnerabilities in the core
computing system. These vulnerabilities can be appear on both
front (software) and back (hardware) ends of the computing
system. While the software vulnerabilities are well researched and
documented, the hardware threats are normally overlooked.
However, with hardware-inclusive technological evolutions like
Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things, hardware
vulnerabilities should be addressed appropriately. In this work, we
propose a virtual experimental platform to study the effect of one
such vulnerability, called hardware Trojans, on SCADA systems.
Through this platform, a comprehensive run time analysis of
hardware Trojan is accomplished and we show that even a timelimited attack can lead to destabilization of the SCADA system
causing hazardous conditions. We demonstrate our platform using
a virtual gas pipeline SCADA model.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
[Security and privacy ~ Malicious design modifications]

General Terms
Security, Control system

Keywords
Hardware Trojan, SCADA system

1. INTRODUCTION
Every major infrastructure and industry in modern world is
operated by SCADA systems. Such autonomous functionality has
enabled efficient operation and increased yield. However, the
same autonomy also poses possible threats through vulnerabilities
in the computing systems that form the heart of SCADA systems.
One of the largest blackouts in American history, that happened in
August 2003, might have been caused by a cyber-attack. Around
50 million people were affected [1]. A nuclear power plant in Oak
Harbor, Ohio, USA was compromised by the Slammer SQL server
worm. The worm managed to disable the safety monitoring system
of the power plant for nearly five hours [2]. Recent attacks
involving STUXNET [3] and HAVEX [4] have shown how fatal
vulnerabilities in SCADA systems can prove to be. Public
communities
discussing
SCADA
vulnerabilities
like
scadastrangelove.org [5] have identified 150 zero day
vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. Given these examples where
critical infrastructure was compromised, it can be seen that
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research in SCADA security is very crucial. It is important to
understand which impacts an attack can have on critical
infrastructure and how to protect against them.
The primary channel for attacks in SCADA systems is through the
computing system, both at the front-end (software) and back-end
(hardware). While software based vulnerabilities are well
documented, there has been very little emphasis on hardware. The
computing hardware in SCADA systems are built using electronic
components based on very large scale Integrated Circuits (ICs)
technology. The incredible demand of ICs has globalized its
industry, where the manufacturing foundries are situated all
around the world. This provides a wider possibility for adversaries
to infiltrate these foundries and get access to the hardware
manufacturing process. Under such circumstances, these
adversaries can add malicious circuitry, called hardware Trojans,
to the existing design and make them stealthy. These hardware
Trojans can provide back door entry for potential attacks, thus
making the computing system vulnerable. In the advent of
technological evolutions in the form of Cyber-Physical Systems
and Internet-of-Things, such hardware vulnerabilities cannot be
overlooked. Since SCADA systems are going to be the steppingstone towards these advance technologies, it is important to
understand hardware based vulnerabilities, like hardware Trojans,
in them. However, such examination will be expensive if it relies
on performing tests on actual SCADA systems.
In this work, we propose to study the effect of hardware Trojan
based vulnerabilities in SCADA systems, through a completely
virtual simulation platform. Our test platform virtualizes the
SCADA system through behavioral description of each block and
their relations. However, since hardware Trojans are small and
stealthy electronic circuits, the computing system of the SCADA
is represented using a digital logic description that emulates the
actual digital circuitry. Using our platform, we have performed
studies that show the capabilities of hardware Trojans in disabling
the control provided by computing system. Such attacks can
completely destabilize the SCADA system leading to hazardous
conditions.
The specific contributions of this work are as follows.
 We present a completely virtual platform for studying
hardware Trojan based vulnerabilities in SCADA
systems,
 We present 3 probable threat models based on the
ability of a hardware Trojan to disable the
controllability of the computing system.

Figure 1. SCADA System

Figure 3. Classification of Hardware Trojans

3. Hardware Trojans

Figure 2. Closed-loop control formed between PLC and
Physical system; PLC hardware is vulnerable to presence of
Hardware Trojan (HT) that can affect the control signal
output.


We have shown that even a seemingly harmless threat
posed by a hardware Trojan, can completely destabilize
the SCADA system.

2. BACKGROUND
A Hardware Trojan is a covert, malicious modification of an
electronic circuit or design, which results in undesired behavior of
an electronic device [6]. These alterations can provide a back door
entry to a computing system. An adversary can also utilize
Trojans to leak sensitive information from a system or can even
deny providing the service during the execution of critical
applications. This can potentially have serious consequences in
critical applications spanning the domains of communications,
space, military and nuclear facilities.
The research and investigation of hardware Trojans are primarily
conducted by IC engineers in a distributed fashion, focusing
mostly on their detection techniques at post manufacturing stages.
They are classified into two categories: 1) logic testing based and
2) side-channel based. The logic testing based detection depends
on rare conditions to activate Trojans occurring at internal nodes
of the circuit under test [7], [8]. They have very large Hardware
Trojan design space and an extremely large number of inputoutput combinations which are required for testing. This makes
test generation computationally infeasible due to time constraints.
Side-channel based techniques involve observing the effect of
Hardware Trojan on one or more physical parameter(s) such as
transient current, leakage current or delay [9]–[12]. And, side
channel based approaches are affected by large process-induced
parameter variations [13]-[18].
Such inadequacies in detection techniques has made it important
to understand the presence on hardware Trojans, in SCADA
systems, at run time in order to device countermeasures. Such
studies obviously need the entire system to be considered instead
of just the computing hardware in order to deal with hardware
Trojans. Therefore, the goal of this project is to create a virtual
simulation platform to study the effect of hardware Trojans on the
overall functionality of the underlying SCADA system. As a part
of it, we have created a virtual platform to study the
vulnerabilities of SCADA gas pipeline system to hardware
Trojans using Simulink and Modelsim.

A hardware Trojan are classified into three main categories
according to their physical, activation and action characteristics.
In [6] Wang et.al developed the first detailed taxonomy for
hardware Trojans (a simple taxonomy devised earlier
differentiated between payload activation logic and triggering).
This comprehensive taxonomy lets researchers examine their
methods against different Trojan types. Although Trojans could
be hybrids of this classification (for instance, they could have
more than one activation characteristic), this taxonomy captures
the elemental characteristics of Trojans and is useful for defining
and evaluating the capabilities of various detection strategies.
The physical characteristics category describes the various
hardware manifestations of Trojans. The type category partitions
Trojans into functional and parametric classes. The functional
class includes Trojans that are physically realized through the
addition or deletion of transistors or gates, whereas the parametric
class refers to Trojans that are realized through modifications of
existing wires and logic. The size category accounts for the
number of components in the chip that have been added, deleted,
or compromised. The distribution category describes the location
of the Trojan in the chip’s physical layout. The structure category
refers to the case when an adversary is forced to regenerate the
layout to insert a Trojan, which could then cause the chip’s
physical form factor to change. Such changes could result in
different placement for some or all design components. Any
malicious changes in physical layout that could change the chip’s
delay and power characteristics would facilitate Trojan detection.
Activation characteristics refer to the criteria that cause a Trojan
to become active and carry out its disruptive function. Trojan
activation characteristics fall into two categories: externally
activated (e.g., by an antenna or a sensor that can interact with the
outside world) and internally activated (which are further
classified as always ON and condition based), ‘Always ON’
means the Trojan is always active and can disrupt the chip’s
function at any time. The condition- based subclass includes
Trojans that are inactive until a specific condition is met. The
activation condition could be based on the output of a sensor that
monitors temperature, voltage, or any type of external
environmental condition (such as electromagnetic interference,
humidity, altitude, or temperature). Alternatively, this condition
could be based on an internal logic state, a particular input
pattern, or an internal counter value. The Trojan in these cases is
implemented by adding logic gates and/or flip- flops to the chip,
and hence is represented as a combinational or sequential circuit.
A common classification of Trojans is based on the activation
mechanism (referred as Trojan trigger) and the effect on the
circuit functionality (referred as Trojan payload). Trojans can be
both combinational (Fig. 4) and sequential triggered (Fig. 5). An

Figure 4. Circuit with Combinational Trojan

Figure 6. Logic diagram of ISCAS’85 Benchmark circuit C17
without Trojan.

Figure 5. Circuit with Sequential Trojan

Figure 7. Logic diagram of ISCAS’85 Benchmark circuit C17
with Trojan.

adversary is expected to choose an extremely rare activation
condition so that it is highly unlikely for the Trojan to trigger
during conventional manufacturing test. Sequentially triggered
Trojans (the so called “time bombs”), on the other hand, are
activated by the occurrence of a sequence of rare events, or after a
period of continuous operation.
In order to provide a detailed explanation of hardware Trojan, we
use ISCAS85 benchmark circuit, c17, whose logic representation
is shown in Fig. 6. It has 5 inputs G1, G2, G3, G4 & G5 and 2
outputs G10 & G11. A typical hardware Trojan which is made of
two XOR gates is inserted, whose activation characteristics
depend on the internal signals of the circuit as shown in Fig 7.
One of the XOR gate (Trojan1) acts as a comparator whose output
will be logic 1 only when its inputs are unequal. This comparator
output is connected as an activation signal to another XOR gate
(Trojan2). When the activation signal is at logic 1, then the Trojan
gets activated flipping the payload signal (G6T) and thereby
producing an error at one of the two primary outputs G10. When
the Trojan is inactive, it is difficult to detect it, since at the post
manufacturing test phase the IC is treated as a black box with
primary inputs and outputs. So the adversary ensures that the
Trojan is rarely activated and can easily evade the conventional
post-manufacturing functional tests. In this case, the Trojan gets
activated only 6 times out of 32 possible input vectors, which
constitute for only 18.75% of the entire input space. For common
computational circuits like 32-bit ALU, the input space
constitutes of 232 possible combinations and it is impossible to go
through all of them for validation. So, it will be extremely
tortuous to detect Trojans in such a circuit using post
manufacturing functional tests. Given the smaller size of these
Trojans, detection through physical and electrical parameters will
also be difficult. Hence, we need better prevention and detection
methodologies which can help in preventing the insertion of
Trojans and in detecting them at the post-manufacturing phase to

make the ICs more secure and reliable. In this work, we handle
the hardware Trojans which change the functionality of the system
by causing logical errors.

4. PROPOSED WORK
4.1 SCADA System
A supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is
used to control industrial systems. Major components of a
SCADA system include a human machine interface (HMI), which
allows a user to monitor and manage the system; a programmable
logic controller (PLC) which serve to control certain aspects of
the physical infrastructure, such as sensors and actuators; a
physical system which is being controlled. The communication
between these components is achieved through a wire bridge
which conveys the sensed data from the physical system to PLC; a
Network SCADA protocol like MODBUS/TCP to transfer data
between PLC and HMI. The PLC will be the computing system
that forms the central core and plays a vital part in stabilizing the
SCADA system.

4.2 Threat Models
Threat 1: Turn off PLC permanently. In this threat model, the
controller is completely taken over by Hardware Trojan and the
system will be destabilized.
Threat 2: Turn off PLC for long period. In this threat model, the
Trojan gets activated after some period and remains active, which
will cut off the controller.
Threat 3: Turn off PLC for short period. In this threat model,
Hardware Trojan is active just for a short period and hence system
should get back to its normal state after the deactivation of Trojan.

Figure 8. Design of Controller to control pump in the pipeline

Figure 9. Hardware Trojan in the Controller using
multiplexer

This threat model will help us to study the time the system will
need to regain its stability.

enables the user to manually control the pump and the valve from
the HMI.

4.3 Hardware Trojan Implementation

4.4.1 Controller Circuit Design

The functional relation between the PLC and Physical system will
form a closed-loop as shown in Fig. 2. The PLC will control the
physical system based on its dynamic changes, which are relayed
through the sensor. The control mechanism is established by
comparing this dynamic response from the physical system with a
threshold value. This relational comparison will trigger the PLC
to provide a control signal to the actuator of the physical system
thus maintaining safe functionality.
The relational comparison followed by subsequent arithmetic
operation and production of control signal will be performed in
the PLC and so it will be built as a digital computing hardware.
As discussed before such hardware can be vulnerable to inclusion
of hardware Trojans. As shown in Fig. 2, such Trojans can be
designed to affect the control signal and damage the capability of
PLC to control the physical system. This will destabilize the entire
SCADA system leading to potential hazardous situations.
In this work, we have tested the effect of such a vulnerability by
designing the PLC as a digital logic circuit and implementing a
hardware Trojan that will alter the digital control signal. In order
to study the proposed threat models, we made the Trojan circuitry
accessible and controllable.

4.4 Case Study: Gas Pipeline System
Gas pipelines are important infrastructures, not only for the power
generation sector, but also for other sectors such as
petrochemicals, chemicals, transportation, manufacturing, and
district heating. The United States Patriot Act defines critical
infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of these matters.” [11]. By this
definition, gas pipelines can be considered critical infrastructures,
and therefore deserve special attention in terms of cyber-security.
The Gas Pipeline Testbed is a small closed pipeline that tries to
mimic the behavior of a real gas pipeline. An electrical pump
increases the pressure inside the pipeline by pumping air into it.
There are also pressure sensors constantly measuring the pressure
inside the pipeline. A solenoid valve alleviates the internal
pressure when opened. The pump, the solenoid valve and the
digital pressure sensor are connected to a Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC) that controls the system. The role for the PLC is
to maintain pressure between a high and a low set point by turning
on and off the pump. There is also a manual operation mode that

The controller that controls the gas pipeline system is
implemented as a digital circuit such that the study of Hardware
Trojans is possible. This controller is designed using a greater
than comparator, less than comparator and an OR gate as shown
in Fig. 8. The inputs to this controller are minimum pressure
point, maximum pressure and the pressure in the pipeline sensed
by the sensor whereas the output is the pump control. The output
of greater than comparator goes ‘High’ when the minimum
pressure point is greater than or equal to the pressure in the
pipeline thereby turning ON the pump control, which increases
the pressure in the system. The output of the less than comparator
goes ‘High’ when the pressure in the pipeline is lesser than or
equal to the maximum pressure point thereby turning ON the
pump control, to increase the pressure in the system. Thus, the
pressure in the pipeline system will be maintained between the
minimum and maximum pressure points as inputted by the user.

4.4.2 Hardware Trojan Design
Now, we design a Hardware Trojan that can cause the threats to
the system as discussed in the above sections. Here, we used a 2
by 1 multiplexer which outputs the Pump Control when Select is
‘0’ and outputs Hardware Trojan when it is ‘1’ as shown in Fig. 9.
The output of 2 by 1 multiplexer, Pump Control Payload is the
payload (signal that gets affected with Trojan) of the Hardware
Trojan.

5. Experimental Results
The experimental setup consists of a SCADA gas pipeline model
created in a Simulink platform and the controller, which controls
the pressure in the pipeline, is co-simulated using Modelsim in
Simulink.

5.1.1 Experimental Setup and Procedure
The experimental setup consists of a SCADA gas pipeline model
created in a Simulink platform and the controller, which controls
the pressure in the pipeline, is co-simulated using Modelsim in
Simulink. The controller is designed as digital circuit in VHDL
language, which gives the flexibility to customize and study the
effect of Hardware Trojans on the system. This controller circuit
is simulated using Modelsim and its output is connected as input
to the Simulink model of SCADA gas pipeline system as shown in
the Fig. 10. We have simulated the above setup to maintain the
pressure in system between 0 and 50. The output of the system is
shown in Fig. 11 in which the Trojan is inactive. It is observed

Figure 10. Experimental setup to study the effect of Hardware
Trojan on SCADA gas pipeline system

Figure 12. Pressure in the SCADA gas pipeline when Trojan is
always active

Figure 11. Pressure in the SCADA gas pipeline when Trojan is
inactive
that the pump control turns OFF when the pressure in the pipeline
goes above 50 and turns ON when it goes below 50, thus
maintaining the pressure within the minimum and maximum
limits in the pipeline.
In this case, the Trojan is deactivated and hence the effect of
Trojan is not observed in spite of its presence which makes
Hardware Trojans stealthy and difficult to detect.

Figure 13. Pressure in the SCADA gas pipeline when Trojan is
activated after 175 seconds

5.1.2 Threat Model 1
In this threat model, we have studied the effect of Hardware
Trojan on the system when it is active. In this case, the Trojan is
active after 10 seconds and remains active for the rest of the time.
We can observe from the simulation results shown in Fig. 12 that
the Trojan makes the pump control to remain ON beyond the
maximum limit (50) and thus the pressure in the pipeline keeps
increasing rapidly.

5.1.3 Threat Model 2
In this threat model, the Trojan is activated after 175 seconds and
remains active. The simulation result is shown in the Fig. 13, it is
inferred that the pressure is maintained within the limits until the
Trojan is active however once the Trojan is active, the system gets
destabilized and the pressure keeps mounting on.

5.1.4 Threat Model 3
In this threat model, the Trojan is active for a small period of time
and we will study how the system stabilizes once the Trojan is
deactivated. The Trojan is active from 100 to 105 seconds and
during this period the system is unstable as the pressure keeps
increasing beyond maximum limit. However, once the Trojan is

Figure 14. Pressure in the SCADA gas pipeline when Trojan is
active for a short period (5 seconds)
inactive the system regains its stability as shown in Fig. 14. Even
though the Trojan is only active for few seconds as compared to
the previous threat models, it ca be seen that the pressure
increases rapidly to a higher state from which the system has to
wait for a long time to recover. Such behavior will not be
conducive in time critical operations. This threat model clearly
shows the typical stealthy and rare function of the Trojan which
can create a hazardous situation.

6. CONCLUSION
SCADA systems are the stepping-stone towards emerging
technological innovations based on automation. It is important to
understand its various vulnerabilities in order to achieve
comprehensive security of our cyber infrastructure. In this work,
we have presented a virtual experimentation platform to study the
effect of hardware Trojans on SCADA systems. We demonstrated
our platform by simulating a gas pipeline SCADA system and
showed the probable effects of hardware Trojan in destabilizing
the system by disabling the computing core. We presented 3 threat
models based on this capability of the Trojan and showed that
even a seemingly harmless attack can destabilize the system and
prove to be potentially hazardous. As a part of future work, we
plan to implement our methodologies not only in mitigating the
effect of Hardware Trojans but also in neutralizing their effect.
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